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• Scientific Council of RAS on economic history;
• Research and Educational Center «The economic history of Central Russia and the Middle Volga region» of Ogarev Mordovia State University;
• Center of Economic History of  Lomonosov Moscow State University

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ISSN 2409-630X (Print), ISSN 2618-916X (Online)

DOI: 10.15507/2409-630X.042.014.201803.311-325

УДК 94(47).084.8

Andrey V. Budanov

The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, (Chelyabinsk, Russia),

e-mail: andreybudanov@yandex.ru

ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3339-7142.

 

PROBLEMS OF FINANCING OF THE USSR MISSILE PRODUCTION BRANCH ON THE EVE OF THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS

 

Introduction. The article is devoted to the problems of financing of the USSR of rocket production branch on the eve of the Caribbean Crisis. At the present stage it is necessary to consider possible negative consequences of development of defensive technologies not to repeat past mistakes and to avoid social and economic crises. Materials and Methods. To study the problem the author of the article uses the published declassified documents and for introduced for scientific use the first time. The methodological basis of this study is the theory of modernization, because it has essential informative and cognitive explanatory potential when studying history of Russia of the middle of the 20th century. The analysis of a problem on the basis of declassified data and theories has allowed to introduce the new facts into scientific circulation and to draw a number of valid conclusions. Results. In the late 1950th – the beginning of the 1960th bases of nuclear missile forces have been created in the Soviet Union. Existence of the advanced military technologies became one of the reasons of world recognition of the Soviet Union in the status of the great power. Strengthening of military power and arms race have led to financial and social problems. First of all, process has involved serious costs for development of military-industrial production and creation of the serving equipment. The financial costs were increased because of this situation. On the eve of the Caribbean Crisis the Soviet army has bought rocketry for 6 billion rubles. It is necessary to increase these costs approximately twice as for production of rocketry required to build new production capacities and starting objects. Discussion and Conclusions. In fact, the absence of private investors and producers forced at first to spend funds for creation of the production capacities making ballistic missiles, and then for purchasing of the products made by them. In this case the defect of the Soviet economic system at which the state has been forced to pay for missiles twice appeared. All costs were carried out at the expense of the state and society. The high cost of implementation of the Soviet rocket project has led to sharp deterioration in a social and economic situation in the country. For minimization of negative consequences it was necessary to reform the system of planning and management of rocket production, to organize the competition between the design organizations and also to refuse production of many samples of rocketry to concentrate financial reserves on creation of the most perspective systems. Nevertheless, valuable considerable expenses and efforts in the country the board which has allowed to strengthen defense capability of the Soviet Union has been created nuclear missile. During the Caribbean Crisis the governance of the USA has realized impossibility of a victory over the USSR in nuclear war. It has forced them to refuse aggressive foreign policy concerning the Soviet block that has led to discharge of international tension.

Keywords: missile production, defense-industrial complex, Caribbean Crisis, financial policy, cold war.

 

For citation: Andrey V. Budanov. Problems of Financing of the USSR Missile Production Branch on the Eve of the Caribbean Crisis. Ekonomicheskaya istoriya = Russian Journal of Economic History. 2018; 14(3): 311–325. (In Russ.). DOI: 10.15507/2409-630X.042.014.201803.311-325

 

Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project No. 16-01-00250.

 

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